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Bricks to Clicks, or Cracks? Why Access to CSO Expertise is More Important Than Ever

The NHS’s shift “from bricks to clicks” is accelerating the adoption of AI and digitally enabled care, but evidence suggests clinical safety assurance is struggling to keep pace with the scale and complexity of deployment. The article explains why early, continuous access to experienced Clinical Safety Officer (CSO) expertise, including fractional or external support, will be increasingly important for healthtech organisations seeking to become and remain NHS-ready.

Bricks to Clicks, or Cracks? Why Access to CSO Expertise is More Important Than Ever

Bricks to Clicks, or Cracks? Why Access to CSO Expertise is More Important Than Ever

The government’s 10 Year Health Plan promises to move the NHS “from bricks to clicks”, replacing outdated infrastructure with AI, genomics, robotics and digitally enabled models of care at a pace rarely attempted across a public health system. But a growing body of research suggests the NHS may be trying to build this digital future on foundations that are already under strain. As technology advances, the challenge for those developing, procuring and using it are shifting from demonstrating not only what works, but also to ensuring that the clinical safety infrastructure evolves, at the same pace, alongside it.

A Compliance Problem Hiding in Plain Sight

At the centre of digital clinical safety in England are DCB0129 and DCB0160, the mandatory clinical risk-management standards governing the development and deployment of health IT. DCB0129 places obligations on organisations that manufacture and maintain health IT systems, while DCB0160 places corresponding obligations on the health and care organisations that deploy and use them. Together, they are intended to ensure that clinical risks are identified, assessed, controlled and monitored throughout the lifecycle of a digital product.

Yet a national cross-sectional study published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research in 2025 found a striking gap between that expectation and what organisations could demonstrate in practice. Researchers approached 239 NHS organisations, of which 204 responded and 178 provided full or partial data, covering 14,747 digital health technology deployments. Among the technologies for which the relevant assurance data were available, only 17.3% were reported as fully assured against both DCB0129 and DCB0160, while around 70% had no documented assurance against either standard.

It is worth noting that those figures need careful interpretation. The researchers were measuring documented assurance, not proving that every technology without that documentation was unsafe, and the study relied on Freedom of Information responses with varying levels of completeness and interpretation between organisations. But that caveat does not make the findings less important. If organisations cannot readily demonstrate which technologies have been clinically assured, what hazards have been identified or how risks are being managed, the problem is not simply missing paperwork. It points to underlying governance issues and that problem will quickly compound as the complexity of digital health increases.

Clinical Safety Under Pressure 

For healthtech organisations looking to sell into the NHS, clinical safety quickly becomes more than an internal product consideration. If a technology falls within the scope of DCB0129, the organisation is expected to nominate or hire a Clinical Safety Officer to oversee the clinical risk-management process. That means identifying hazards, reviewing controls, challenging assumptions and ensuring that patient safety is considered as the product develops, changes and moves towards deployment.

For many early-stage and growing organisations, the difficulty is not recognising the importance of the role but accessing the right expertise at the right time. A company may reach the point where NHS procurement, integration or deployment requires more formal clinical safety assurance long before there is enough ongoing work to justify recruiting a permanent CSO. At the same time, products are becoming more complex, more interconnected and, increasingly, AI-enabled, which makes clinical safety harder to treat as a one-off compliance exercise.

The result is a growing need for flexible Clinical Safety Officer capability that can sit alongside product, clinical and leadership teams as the organisation moves towards NHS readiness. This ongoing CSO support is already important for traditional health IT, but AI raises the stakes further.

Safety Processes Built for a Slower Era

Digital clinical safety processes were largely designed around an environment in which systems changed more slowly, product releases were less frequent and the boundary between software and clinical decision-making was easier to define. That is no longer the environment in which healthtech companies operate.

Cloud software can change continuously, clinical workflows evolve, integrations change, models are updated and new functionality can alter the way clinicians interact with a product without changing the underlying purpose of the system. Clinical safety therefore cannot be treated as a compliance exercise completed once before launch. It has to be considered as a continuous discipline.

Hazards identified at version one may not be the same hazards present at version five. A product that was low risk in one workflow may carry very different risks when deployed in another, while a mitigation that appeared effective during a controlled pilot may behave differently at scale. This is exactly why clinical safety needs to sit inside product development, procurement, implementation and change management from the beginning rather than being added at the end.

The Real Constraint May Be Capacity

For healthtech organisations, this creates a practical problem. You may need credible Clinical Safety Officer capability long before the business is large enough to justify employing a permanent, full-time CSO. That point often arrives earlier than expected: a product enters an NHS pathway, a procurement process asks for a Clinical Safety Case Report, a new integration introduces additional clinical risk, a pilot becomes a live deployment or an AI-enabled feature changes how a clinician interacts with the system.

Suddenly, clinical safety is no longer something that can be dealt with later. But hiring a permanent CSO is not always proportionate, particularly for organisations that need specialist input at key stages rather than a full-time internal role.

That is where a fractional or external CSO model can make sense. The aim is not to outsource accountability; the organisation always remains responsible for its clinical safety obligations. Rather, it is to bring in the specialist capability required to meet them properly and in a more timely, and often more cost effective, manner.

An experienced external CSO can work alongside product, clinical, engineering and leadership teams to support hazard identification, clinical risk management, DCB0129 activities, Clinical Safety Case Reports, product change and ongoing governance. Crucially, they can also provide something that is often difficult to create internally: independent clinical challenge. A good CSO is not there simply to sign a safety case. They are there to ask whether the assumptions behind it are sound.

What the Research Is Really Telling Us

The emerging problem revealed by the recent research is not simply that too many technologies lack documented assurance. It is that the system responsible for producing that assurance may not have enough capacity to keep pace with the volume, pace and complexity of digital transformation now being asked of it.

This has implications for the NHS, but it also has implications for every organisation building, funding, procuring or deploying digital health technology. The organisations best placed to succeed will not be those that treat clinical safety as a final-stage compliance hurdle. They will be the ones that build it into product development, procurement, implementation and change from day one.

And that does not necessarily mean building a permanent clinical safety function before the organisation is ready. However, It does mean making sure the right expertise is available early enough, consistently enough and with enough independence to influence the decisions that matter.

NHS England is currently reviewing DCB0129 and DCB0160, with a public consultation open until 11 September 2026. Whatever changes emerge from that process, the direction of travel is already clear: digital clinical safety is becoming more important, not less.

As AI increases both the pace of product development and the complexity of clinical risk, access to experienced Clinical Safety Officer capability is likely to become an increasingly important part of being NHS-ready. The next bottleneck in digital health may not be innovation itself, but the clinical safety capacity required to deploy it responsibly.

Need CSO Capability Without Hiring a Permanent CSO?

Our CSO support service gives healthtech organisations flexible access to experienced Clinical Safety Officer support without the need to recruit a full-time internal role. We work alongside product, clinical and leadership teams to support DCB0129 clinical risk management, hazard identification, Clinical Safety Case Reports, product change and ongoing clinical safety governance.

As the NHS is moving from bricks to clicks at pace, we must make sure that clinical safety is considered as part of the foundations of the build, not a snag picked up at handover.